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Legal
Lore
Sin, Scandal, and
Substantive Due Process
by Wendy Collins Perdue
For students of civil procedure, the
names Pennoyer and Neff evoke these
dry facts: In an initial suit, one J.H.
Mitchell sued Neff in Oregon state
court. Because Neff could not be found
within Oregon, he was served by pub-
lication. Neff never appeared, and a
default judgment was entered against
him. To satisfy the judgment, Mitchell
attached Neff's Oregon real estate. The
property was sold at auction, and
Pennoyer later acquired it. Nearly a
decade later, Neff returned to Oregon
and brought suit in federal court to
evict Pennoyer from the land, claiming
that the original judgment was invalid.
The Supreme Court found for Neff in
an opinion that has become a corner-
stone of personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Those familiar facts do not begin to
tell the full story, which begins with a
young man, Marcus Neff, heading
across the country by covered wagon
train, presumably to seek his fortune.
Neff left Iowa in early 1848 at the age
of 24, joining a wagon train of five
companies of wagons. At that time, the
question of Oregon statehood was
being considered in Congress, and
there was much speculation that large
tracts of the vast, undeveloped land of
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Oregon would be made available to
homesteaders. The speculation proved
to be correct, and Marcus Neff was one
of the earliest settlers to claim land
under the Oregon Donation Act.
To qualify for land under the
Donation Act, one had to be a citizen
living in Oregon and submit a request
for land by December 1, 1850. Inter-
estingly, Neff's land request was
originally dated December 15, 1850,
which would have made it too late,
but "December" was crossed out and
"September" written in. This is the
first of many instances suggesting that
events surrounding Pennoyer v. Neff
may have been tainted by fraud and
deception.
Not surprisingly, registration of a
Donation Act claim required a certain
amount of paperwork. In addition to
the initial claim, the homesteader was
required after four years to submit the
affidavits of two disinterested people
affirming that the homesteader had cul-
tivated the land for his own use. Neff
secured two affidavits, which were
submitted prematurely in 1853 and
resubmitted in 1856. The 1856 submis-
sion should have entitled Neff to
receive a patent to the land, but the
government was notoriously slow in
processing claims, and 10 years passed
before Neff received his land patent.
Early in 1862, Neff made the unfor-
tunate decision to consult a local
Portland attorney, J.H. Mitchell.
Establishing the facts about events in
which Mitchell was involved is partic-
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ularly difficult because, as one research
librarian commented, "Mitchell was
the kind of person who ended his cor-
respondence with 'Burn this letter after
reading."' Although the nature of the
legal services is unclear, Neff may have
consulted Mitchell in an attempt to
expedite the paperwork concerning his
land patent. Neff was illiterate, and at
the time he consulted Mitchell, the gov-
ernment had still not issued his patent.
Mitchell, moreover, specialized in land
matters. In mid-1862, several months
after Neff first consulted Mitchell,
another affidavit was filed on Neff's
behalf. Several months thereafter, Neff
received a document from the govern-
ment certifying that he had met the cri-
teria for issuance of a patent.
Whatever Neff's reasons for seeking
Mitchell's legal services, he certainly
could have done better in his choice of
lawyers. "J.H. Mitchell" was actually
the Oregon alias of one John Hipple.
Hipple had been a teacher in Penn-
sylvania, who, after being forced to
marry the 15-year-old student whom he
had seduced, left teaching and took up
law. He practiced with a partner for
several years but apparently concluded
that it was time to move on to greener
pastures. Thus, in 1860 Hipple headed
west, taking with him $4,000 of client
money and his then-current paramour,
a local school teacher. They made their
way to California, where Hipple aban-
doned the teacher, ostensibly because
she was sick and her medical expenses
had become too burdensome, and
moved on to Portland, Oregon. There,
using the name John H. Mitchell, he
quickly established himself as a suc-
cessful lawyer, specializing in land liti-
gation and railroad right-of-way cases.
He also remarried without bothering
to divorce his first wife. As one his-
torian has observed, Mitchell's success
as a lawyer cannot be attributed to
either intellectual or oratorical skills;
rather, his strengths included excep-
tional political instincts, a generous
disposition, and a friendly handshake.
What he lacked in ethics and ability, he
made up for with persistence and a
desire for success. In his subsequent
political career, he became known as a
man whose "political ethics justified
any means that would win the battle."
Mitchell was first elected to the state
senate in 1862, became president of the
state senate in 1864, was seven times a
candidate for the U.S. Senate, and was
elected in four of those contests.
Mitchell's ethical standards as a
lawyer were no higher than his ethics
as a politician. As the Oregonian
observed in 1882: "His political meth-
ods are indeed pitched on a sufficiently
low scale but not below his methods as
a lawyer." Given Mitchell's reputation,
one might at least question whether
Neff in fact owed the money Mitchell
claimed was due. Neff paid Mitchell
$6.50, but Mitchell claimed he was
owed an additional $209. Although
Mitchell's services were rendered
between early 1862 and mid-1863,
Mitchell waited several years to take
legal action against Neff, perhaps pur-
posely waiting until Neff left the state.
On November 3, 1865, Mitchell filed
suit against Neff in Oregon state court,
seeking $253.14 plus costs. Mitchell
secured jurisdiction under Oregon
statute § 55, which provided that after
due diligence, if the defendant cannot
be found within the state, he may be
served by publication. Mitchell sup-
plied an affidavit in which he asserted
that Neff was living somewhere in
California and could not be found.
Mitchell provided no details as to what
he had done to locate Neff, and given
Mitchell's lack of scruples, one might
wonder whether Neff's whereabouts
were indeed unknown to Mitchell and
whether he had made any attempt to
locate Neff. Notice of the lawsuit was
published for six weeks in the Pacific
Christian Advocate, a weekly newspa-
per published under the authority of the
Methodist Episcopal Church and
devoted primarily to religious news and
inspirational articles.
In initiating the litigation, Mitchell
made what ultimately proved to be a
crucial mistake. Mitchell's affidavit
asserted that Neff owned property, but
he did not attach the property at that
time. Mitchell most likely neglected
this step because Oregon law did not
appear to require attachment as a pre-
requisite for reliance on § 55.
A default in judgment in the amount
of $294.98 was entered against Neff on
February 19, 1866. Although Mitchell
had an immediate right to execute on
the judgment, he waited until early July
of 1866 to seek a writ of execution,
possibly waiting for the arrival of
Neff's land patent. The title, which was
sent from Washington, D.C., on March
22, 1866, would have taken several
months to arrive in Oregon and thus
probably arrived in Oregon shortly
before Mitchell sought the writ of exe-
cution. Interestingly, although Mitchell
had alleged that Neff could not be
found, the Oregon land office appar-
ently had no difficulty delivering the
patent to Neff.
Under Oregon law, to secure execu-
tion, one had to obtain a writ of execu-
tion and post and publish notice for
four weeks. All the steps were appar-
ently taken. On August 7, 1866, the
property was sold at a sheriff's auction
for $341.60. Notably, the buyer was not
Sylvester Pennoyer, as the Supreme
Court opinion and commentators have
implied. The property was purchased
by none other than J.H. Mitchell, who
three days later assigned the property
to Sylvester Pennoyer.
Pennoyer had much in common with
Mitchell. He, like Mitchell, was a
Portland lawyer, involved in politics
(Mitchell was a Republican; Pennoyer
was a Democrat) and active in real
estate speculation. There is no evidence
available on whether Pennoyer had
actual knowledge of or connection to
the original action, though it is certainly
possible. Moreover, because he took
title through Mitchell, it is not clear that
he should have been treated as a true
innocent third-party purchaser.
It appears that for the next eight
years, Pennoyer peacefully minded his
own business, doing those things one
would expect of any property owner:
He paid taxes, cut some timber, and
sold a small portion of the land. The
peace was broken in 1874 when Neff
reappeared on the scene.
The evidence suggests that Neff
began making trouble for Pennoyer
several months before he actually filed
suit, because in July of 1874, Pennoyer
began taking steps to protect the valid-
ity of his title. It seems that when the
property was originally sold at the sher-
iff's auction, local officials had been
somewhat lax in the matter of title. The
sheriff's deed was not signed until five
months after the sale, and then it was
signed by the deputy sheriff, not the
sheriff. In an apparent effort to ensure
that this carelessness was not the basis
for an attack on his title, Pennoyer
obtained the signature of the then-
current sheriff on a second deed dated
July 21, 1874. Not taking any chances,
three days later he acquired still a third
deed, this one signed by the man who
had been sheriff at the time of the sale.
But all the precautions were for naught;
ultimately, Pennoyer was evicted.
(please turn to page 56)
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If you are fortunate enough to have
the prosecution hand you an issue
involving questionable prosecutorial
conduct, play it to the jury. Particularly
when an unethical practice will not
result in reversible error but can be
exposed at trial, you can wreak havoc
with the prosecution's case.
Prosecutors have historically used
the media to further political agendas
or to respond to public outcries for
action. There are situations in which
putting the prosecution on trial in the
media may be in your client's best
interest. At the very least, a defense
lawyer can throw a prosecutor off-
balance by focusing on the pros-
ecution's conduct rather than the
defendant's.
Whether an issue involves with-
holding of key exculpatory evidence
or distorting or manipulating witness
testimony, prosecutors are exceedingly
uncomfortable when their conduct
finds its way into the substantive
aspects of the case. The prosecutor's
self-image as the good guy wearing
the white hat may be punctured. The
prosecutor may do some rethinking,
particularly if the media has now put
the prosecution's conduct under a
microscope.
In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis urged
that the courts should ensure that gov-
ernmental overreaching be firmly dealt
with:
Decency, security, and liberty alike
demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules
of conduct that are commands to
the citizen. In a government of
laws, existence of the government
will be imperiled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our
government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is conta-
gious. If the government becomes
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy. To declare that in
the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means-
to declare that the government
may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against that perni-
cious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575 (1928).
The prosecutor wields awesome
power in our system of justice. Only
the combined willingness of the courts,
defense lawyers, and prosecutors to
vigorously challenge prosecutorial
misconduct can prevent abuse of that
power. LE
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(continued from page 42)
The case of Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F.
Cas. at 1280, was filed in federal court
on September 10, 1874, before Judge
Matthew Deady. There is no question
that by the time of Neff v. Pennoyer,
Deady knew of Mitchell's lack of
scruples. Deady was not only a distin-
guished jurist and long-time resident of
Oregon, he was also an acute observer
of life and politics in Oregon. He kept
extensive diaries in which he referred
to the events and prominent people of
the day. By the time Neff v. Pennoyer
arose, Mitchell's prior activities in
Pennsylvania and his bigamous mar-
riage had received wide public atten-
tion in Oregon, and Deady had closely
followed the scandal.
By June of 1873, Deady thought all
the scandals would be the end of
Mitchell. As he explained: "I think he
[Mitchell] must go down. Seduction,
desertion, theft, clandestine change of
name and absconding and bigamy are
too much for a man to carry in the
Senate, though he is making a
desparate [sic] fight of it." Mitchell
nonetheless survived and even flour-
ished. As time went by, Deady's diary
entries displayed an increasing con-
tempt for the man. After 1873, Deady
generally referred to Mitchell by his
born name, Hipple. On election day in
1876, Deady stated in disgust: "Have
not voted for Congressman since the
Republicans put Hipple in the platform
in 1873 and don't think I will until they
take him out..."
Deady also had further reason to
doubt Mitchell's integrity. In 1873,
allegations of bribery by Mitchell and
others surfaced in connection with a
Senate election. Deady recorded in his
diary that Ben Holliday, a political ally
of Mitchell's, had reportedly spent
$20,000 in bribes to buy the votes
necessary to ensure Mitchell's election.
Deady, along with the U.S. attorney in
Oregon, pushed for a prompt and
thorough investigation of the matter.
When one grand jury refused to return
an indictment, Deady ordered a new
grand jury.
It looked as if indictments might be
returned until Mitchell managed to use
further bribery to bring the investiga-
tion to a halt. The attorney general at
that time, George H. Williams, also
from Oregon, had recently been nomi-
nated to the U.S. Supreme Court, but
his confirmation was in doubt. Senator
Mitchell approached Williams and
offered to vote for confirmation if, in
exchange, Williams would halt the
grand jury. Williams agreed and
ordered the Oregon U.S. attorney to
drop the matter. When he refused,
Williams fired him. Commenting on
this incident, Deady called the removal
of the US. attorney "[a]n atrocious act
for which W[illiams] & M[itchell]
deserve severe punishment."
Neff apparently had prospered in
California. He had settled in San
Joaquin with a wife and family as well
as servants, property, and livestock. He
was prepared, however, to leave his
home in California and move himself,
his wife, and his daughter to Oregon
for a year to pursue his various legal
actions.
The opening salvo between Neff and
Pennoyer was fired when Neff sued to
evict Pennoyer, but the war did not end
there. After Pennoyer lost the eviction
suit and costs were awarded against
him, he battled bitterly over the amount
of those costs. Neff was again the win-
ner, and adding insult to injury, he pro-
ceeded to sue Pennoyer again-this
time to recover money damages sus-
tained as a result of Pennoyer's cutting
down timber on the property. Pennoyer
counterclaimed to collect property
taxes that he had paid from 1866 to
1875. The counterclaim was dismissed,
and Pennoyer's defense of the damage
action proved to be the closest he got to
a victory: The jury found for Neff but
awarded only nominal damages.
When the dust had settled, Pennoyer,
who the Supreme Court assumed was a
bona fide purchaser for value, was left
holding the bag. Pennoyer had pur-
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chased the land for "valuable consider-
ation" and paid the taxes on it for a
number of years, yet he found himself
evicted, with nothing to show for his
money and subject to suit for trespass
for entering the land he thought he
owned. There is no evidence that
Pennoyer did or could ever recover the
loss from anyone.
Following the litigation, Neff disap-
peared into obscurity; not so Pennoyer
and Mitchell. Pennoyer went on to be
governor of Oregon for two terms, fol-
lowed by one term as mayor of
Portland, but he remained bitter about
his defeat in Pennoyer v. Neff. Ten
years after the Supreme Court decision,
in his inaugural address as governor,
Pennoyer decried that decision as a
usurpation of state power. He remained
a vociferous critic of the Supreme
Court, urging at one point that the
entire Court should be impeached,
explaining:
We have during this time been liv-
ing under a government not based
upon the Federal Constitution, but
under one created by the plausible
sophistries of John Marshall....
Our constitutional government has
been supplanted by a judicial
oligarchy.
Mitchell also remained in the public
eye. He was elected to the U.S. Senate
in 1872, lost his senate seat in 1879, but
was reelected in 1885. By modem stan-
dards, Mitchell's reelection is quite
extraordinary. Shortly before the 1885
election, Judge Deady, the lower court
judge in Pennoyer v. Neff, came into
possession of a set of love letters that
Mitchell had written to Mitchell's sec-
ond wife's younger sister during the
five years he carried on an affair with
her. Deady turned over the love letters
to a newspaper, the Oregonian, an
outspoken critic of Mitchell. The
Oregonian willingly published the let-
ters for all to read and enjoy. Despite
the scandal, Mitchell was elected four
days later, something that Deady called"a disgrace to the state and a reproach
to humanity."
Scandal was a way of life for
Mitchell. In 1905, he, along with a
number of other prominent Oregon
officials, was indicted in connection
with a massive land fraud scheme. The
scheme was a simple one. After pass-
ing the Donation Act, Congress had
passed the Homestead Act of 1862 and
the Timber and Stone Act of 1878. All
of them offered small tracts of land to
individual settlers. Aspiring lumber
barons trying to assemble large tracts
of land transported huge numbers of
settlers to land offices to file dummy
applications. With a few well-placed
bribes, the applications would be ap-
proved, and the settlers would then
transfer their deeds to Mitchell and oth-
ers in exchange for a modest payoff.
In July of 1905, while still serving in
the US. Senate, Mitchell was convicted
and sentenced to six months in jail, a
$1,000 fine, and complete disbarment
from public office. In December of that
same year, while his appeal was pend-
ing, Mitchell died, apparently from
complications following a tooth extrac-
tion. The Daily Oregon Statesman
reported that the Senate adjourned
without any official recognition of
Mitchell's death, though the chaplain"recalled the situation to mind in his
prayer by referring pointedly to corrup-
tion and death and by praying that the
members of the Senate might be given
strength to bear each other's burdens."
Possibly moved by the chaplain's
prayer, the Senate later passed a resolu-
tion to pay Mitchell's funeral expenses.
The fraudulent scheme is interesting
not only because it was the last and
among the most public of the scandals
that had become a way of life for
Mitchell but also because the nature of
the scheme itself raises a nagging,
though unanswerable, question: Were
the initial transactions between Neff
and Mitchell part of an aborted fraudu-
lent arrangement? One can only
wonder. I
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Creative
Defenses
(continued from page 25)
reports, but you will hear about it at
trial. There are two possible responses.
One is the classic cross-examination,
designed to demonstrate the impor-
tance of thoroughness and accuracy in
report writing. In essence, you argue to
the jury that if it is not in the reports, it
did not happen. The other approach is
to incorporate the new fact into the
defense. Your expert can help do this.
The new fact in my case was that my
client was totally calm after being strip-
searched. She was not crying; she did
not appear frightened; she was not hys-
terical. As you might expect, my expert
helped fit this fact into my theory. Of
course she was calm, my expert testi-
fied: She was finally safe. She had
finally escaped her tormentor. She had
found sanctuary. My closing argument
began to take its final shape as my expert
testified:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is
that consistent with a sophisticated
heroin smuggler? They are calm at
the border and then panic when
arrested. My client's reaction was
just the opposite.
By using the new fact to my advan-
tage, I had actually strengthened the
defense case.
My experience is that jurors are truly
undecided at the close of proof in syn-
drome cases. They go back and forth in
their minds. It is difficult for them. The
defendant is an admitted heroin smug-
gler, an admitted cocaine distributor, or
an admitted methamphetamine manu-
facturer, and the jurors are being asked
to set the defendant free. Under the cir-
cumstances, you will be under more pres-
sure than usual to sum up effectively.
Make your closing argument as dra-
matic and powerful as possible. For
example, by the time your summation
is finished in a posttraumatic stress
case, the jurors should be in the fox-
holes, in the mud with your client,
watching their best friends dying
around them. They should be able to
hear the bombs exploding overhead.
They should be uncomfortable and
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